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The novel coronavirus pandemic generates extensive attention in political and scholarly 
domains 1–4. Its potentially lasting prospects, economic and social consequences call for a 
better understanding of its nature. The widespread expectations of large portions of the 
population to be infected or vaccinated before containing the COVID-19 epidemics rely 
on assuming a homogeneous population. In reality, people differ in the propensity to 
catch the infection and spread it further. Here, we incorporate population heterogeneity 
into the Kermack-McKendrick SIR compartmental model 5 and show the cost of the 
pandemic may be much lower than usually assumed. We also indicate the crucial role of 
correctly planning lockdown interventions. We found that an efficient lockdown strategy 
may reduce the cost of the epidemic to as low as several percents in a heterogeneous 
population. That level is comparable to prevalences found in serological surveys 6. We 
expect that our study will be followed by more extensive data-driven research on 
epidemiological dynamics in heterogeneous populations. 
Introduction 
Because of the novelty and urgency of the situation, epidemiological models inform 
decision-making 1,7–13 in addressing the COVID-19 pandemic. Those models indicate 
high contagiousness of the virus and raise concerns about the majority of the population 
to be infected (if not vaccinated). The basic reproduction number  
 
 of the pandemic at 
its beginning was estimated to be around 3 9,14–16, which implies 1  1  
 
⁄ , i.e., about 67 
percent of the population must be infected or vaccinated before the infection may be 
controlled without lockdown measures. This conclusion has affected mitigation policies 
in many countries, it has also contributed to expectations of recurrent waves of the 
epidemic. 
Those models, however, ignore varying social engagement, epidemic-awareness, 
and hygiene preparedness that, along with other factors, contribute to the varying 
propensity of contracting the disease and spreading it to others. Various reports suggest 
10-20 percent of cases may be responsible for 80 percent of the COVID-19 transmissions 
17–19
. These findings illuminate the fact that while the majority of people may barely 
contribute to the spread of the epidemics thanks to either limited social engagement or 
higher alertness and better hygiene, few others may become superspreaders infecting 
dozens of people. An essential practical conclusion from this conclusion was a call to aim 
the mitigation policies at superspreaders to reduce the basic reproduction number 
(average number of secondary infections per one initial infected person) and contain the 
spread of the infection. Another aspect of the heterogeneity, however, may demand to 
revise that conclusion and readdress the prospects of the pandemic and mitigation 
policies. The population heterogeneity is an essential player in the kinetics of the 
epidemic, because when the minority who contributes most to the spread of the virus 
contracts the disease and develops immunity, the outbreak may abruptly come to an end 
before the expected majority gets affected. Differential contagiousness also matters for 
how to manage the lockdown policies and whether to assume the recurrent waves of the 
epidemic after the lift of the social isolation measures or Autumn cooling. Furthermore, 
population heterogeneity may shorten the course of the outbreaks, because those with 
higher social engagement will also be the first to catch the infection. 
 
Results 
In Figure 1, we present modeling results for three populations: the homogeneous 
population (the orange color), the heterogeneous population where 20 percent of those 
infected spread the virus in 80 percent cases (the blue color), and the heterogeneous 
population where 10 percent of infected are responsible for 80 percent of the secondary 
infections (the green color). Details of the simulation model are provided in the 
Supplementary Information. In all cases, the basic reproduction number is  
 
 3.  
In pane a, we present results for the evolution of the infected population (per 1000 
original population) in scenarios with no lockdown and show numbers of ever-infected 
throughout the epidemic. With no policy intervention, the epidemic in the homogeneous 
population ends up with almost everybody (95 percent) infected. Under the basic 
reproduction number of three, the epidemics could have been checked after 67 percent of 
the population gets infected. In reality, that threshold may be surpassed thanks to the 
gained momentum of the spread of the infection. In the heterogeneous cases, the total 
numbers infected are also substantial (27.6 and 14.1 percent, respectively) but much 
lower than in the homogeneous case. The peak levels of the infected population are also 
much higher (56.1 percent) in the homogeneous population than in the heterogeneous 
ones (12.1 and 5.8 percent). Also note that the more heterogeneous is the population, the 
earlier is the peak of the epidemic. An intuition to this observation is that the faster 
infection (and recovery) of the superspreaders accelerates the epidemics in its early phase 
while slowing it down in a later phase. 
In panes b-d, we present results for three timing options for the lockdown that 
lasts over 28 days and reduces the spread of the virus by 90 percent. When started too 
early (day 30, pane b), the lockdown leaves too many people susceptible to the virus and 
facilitates a substantial second wave. The total infected population is nearly the same as 
in the no-lockdown variant for the homogeneous population but considerably lower for 
the heterogeneous populations.  
With a better timing of the lockdown, the long-term costs of the epidemics are 
much lower. The lockdown presented in pane c (starts in day 39) is optimal for the more 
heterogeneous population that experiences, with the optimal lockdown timing, no second 
wave (and the total number infected is minimal at 4.9 percent). That lockdown, however, 
is yet too early for the less heterogeneous population where a moderate second epidemic 
wave develops and leads to a total of 15.8 percent infected (a substantially higher cost as 
compared to the minimal cost of 11 percent associated with the lockdown starting in day 
44). In the homogeneous case, the second wave is even higher, and almost everybody 
(93.3 percent) is, again, gets infected. Only a later lockdown that starts in day 55 (pane d) 
produces the optimal result for the homogeneous population (68.8 percent infected). 
While the first wave of the epidemics in the heterogeneous cases is earlier and more 
compressed as compared to the homogeneous case, the second wave, on the contrary, is 
later and more stretched out. Even if beneficial in terms of a lower peak, an extended 
small second wave may misguide the policymaker about the long-term efficiency of the 
lockdown measures. 
Heterogeneous scenarios show much lower long-term costs of the epidemics and 
peak levels of the infected as compared to the traditional homogeneous case. If the 
lockdown had been more selective, better protecting the non-spreading population, those 
numbers could have been even smaller. Indeed, the epidemics could, in principle, be 
contained after most of the superspreaders were infected (bringing total infected 
populations down to about 1.5 and 0.3 percent in the two heterogeneous populations). On 
the other hand, a lockdown may also increase the cost of the epidemic if it selectively 
protects the superspreader population and results in many unnecessary infections among 
the non-spreaders. 
Our modeling suggests that the optimally scheduled lockdown should only start at 
the moment when the susceptible population falls to such a level that the instantaneous 
reproduction number drops below the unity threshold. (See the Supplementary 
Information for the derivation of the reproduction number for the heterogeneous case.) 
After reaching that threshold, one should implement the strictest possible lockdown to 
cool off the epidemics’ momentum. That moment is earlier in the heterogeneous case for 
two reasons. Firstly, thanks to the higher infection rate and faster removal of the 
superspreaders from the susceptible population. Secondly, because of the faster decline of 
the reproduction number due to the compositional change that may only occur in a 
heterogeneous population. Milder but more prolonged lockdowns appear to be less 
efficient because longer-lasting epidemics result in more avoidable infections of the non-
spreaders (simulations not shown here). 
 
  
Fig. 1. Evolution of the epidemics in three population scenarios: the homogeneous 
population (the orange color), the population where 20 percent of infected spread the 
virus in 80 percent cases (the blue color), and the population where 10 percent infected 
spread the infection in 80 percent cases (the green color). In all cases, the basic 
reproduction number is three. Horizontal axis: time (days) after 0.01 percent of the 
population gets infected; vertical axis: infected people per 1000 population; percents 
shown in the charts indicate proportions of the population infected throughout the 
epidemics. Pane a: no lockdown; panes b-d: lockdowns start in days 30, 44, and 55, 
respectively, last over 28 days, and reduce the spread of the infection by 90 percent 
(shaded areas indicate the lockdown periods). 
 
Discussion 
Expectations that about 70 percent of people may be infected before containing the 
pandemic were implicitly based on assuming population homogeneity. Contrary to those 
expectations, we show that the population heterogeneity may bring that threshold level 
down to as few as 14 percent with a similar basic reproduction number. Population 
heterogeneity, it appears, may even outweigh the vaccination in its importance as a factor 
checking the spread of the disease. We urgently need to fully understand the extent and 
nature of how people differ in susceptibility to the infection and the ability to spread it 
and appreciate that in our decision-making.  
In the long run, a lower number of people infected means fewer causalities to the 
virus. In the short run, however, lockdown policies around the world take the capacity of 
the healthcare system into account too. In that context, it is notable that population 
heterogeneity also reduces the peak levels of the infected population (from 56 percent, as 
in the homogeneous case, to 6-12 percent). 
Lockdown, when well-scheduled, is capable of substantially reducing the cost of 
the outbreak. The timing of the lockdown is crucial in all scenarios. When prematurely 
implemented, the lockdown leaves too large a portion of the population susceptible to the 
infection, which results in the second wave of the epidemic. In such cases, the epidemic 
may gain momentum and eventually lead to nearly the same total number of infected 
persons as in the case of no lockdown. The second wave appears to stretch over a more 
extended period in the heterogeneous cases, which may misguide policymakers in their 
assessment of the efficiency of the lockdown. Too late a lockdown, however, is also 
inefficient, because it allows for many avoidable infections. 
In the optimal lockdown strategy, one should wait until the proportions susceptible 
fall to levels where the instantaneous reproduction number turns unity.  After reaching 
that threshold, the lockdown measures should be implemented with maximal possible 
strength to cool off the epidemic’ momentum and halt the further spread of the virus. To 
design such an optimal policy response, however, it is mandatory to understand the 
kinetics of the epidemic well and assess the threshold correctly. That includes accounting 
for the role of population heterogeneity. 
SIR-type epidemiological models and their extensions play an important role in 
designing policy responses to the COVID-19 and other epidemics. Our results imply that 
we should further extend those models to include different predispositions to catch and 
spread the infection. 
With optimal lockdown strategy, the total number of infected people may be 
reduced to as low as five percent in the heterogeneous population. Notably, such level of 
prevalence is of the same magnitude as was found in serological surveys 6. Without 
undermining the importance of vaccine research, our results indicate the possibility of 
containing the COVID-19 pandemic without large-scale vaccinations. 
Population heterogeneity also brings up the topic of selective lockdown. Both 
extreme selective lockdowns, the one protecting the non-spreading part of the population 
primarily and another one affecting only the superspreaders, may be realistic. On the one 
hand, there are all reasons to expect that those who are socially more engaged and less 
prepared to prevent the infection (such as epidemic deniers or hygienically less careful) 
will also be less affected by lockdown measures. That may contribute to the selectivity of 
the first type and reduction of the eventual cost of the epidemic. On the other hand, 
closing down public workplaces, introducing strict social distancing, isolation, or public 
hygiene measures may affect more the superspreaders while having limited effect, if at 
all, on socially less engaged and initially more prepared people. That may form lockdown 
selectivity of the second type and exaggerate the cost of the epidemic. Which scenarios 
develop in reality needs urgently being examined while countries move into the post-
lockdown phases.  
Long-term effects of the population heterogeneity reported here also call for 
revisiting the policy recommendations with respect to the superspreaders. The usual 
policy recommendation with respect to the superspreaders is to maximize lockdown 
efficiency among the superspreaders. Yet, we indicate that such a policy may delay but 
not prevent the second wave of the epidemic and spread, unnecessarily, the infection 
more into the non-spreaders population. We need to address this issue in designing social 
isolation policies.  
The extent and type of population heterogeneity depend on many factors that need 
to be studied. Those include demographic factors such as age and sex, kinship structures 
and relations, household sizes and roles within them. Factors of heterogeneity also 
include biological predispositions, behavioral patterns (that, in turn, may depend on 
demographic circumstances, such as the presence of persons vulnerable to the disease in 
the household or kinship networks), educational, occupational, and income differentials, 
and others. A better understanding of these relations is instrumental in combating both 
the current urgency and other communicable diseases.  To address those issues, however, 
we need representative and comparable statistics on how we differ in odds to catch and 
then to spread the virus. Such data are barely available, and we call statistical and 
healthcare agencies to urgently fill the gap in data on population heterogeneity. 
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Supplementary. Materials and Methods 
The heterogeneous SIR model  
We incorporate population heterogeneity into the discrete version of the Kermack-
McKendrick SIR compartmental model 5. To distinguish contributions to the spread of 
the epidemic, we consider a set  of possible levels of the parameter of communicability 
 	 . The latter is interpreted here as the number of people to whom an infected person 
passes the virus on at the beginning of the epidemic when nearly the entire population is 
yet susceptible to the infection. We term  	  the communicability parameter (type   
for brevity), although it may also reflect other factors that contribute to varying 
propensities of contracting and spreading the disease. Those factors may include varying 
levels of hygiene preparedness, behavioral patterns, occupation, kinship relations, 
household composition, etc. We disaggregate the population into groups of different 
levels of the communicability parameter: 






∑



, 


, (1) 
here, 
 is the population size at time , 
,  is the size of the subpopulation of type 
 at time ; the summation is performed over all possible values of the communicability 
parameter  	 . To model the spread of the infection, we consider the SIR model where 
the population consists of susceptible (), infected (), and recovered ( ) compartments: 
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We assume a symmetric model where both the propensity of catching the virus and the 
propensity of spreading it are proportional to the communicability parameter . Hence, 
we model new infections as follows: 

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, (3) 
here, ,   1 is the number of new infections of persons of type  during the period 
  1, ,  is the stock of infected people of type  by the end of the period ;  is the 
model parameter that will further be related to the original susceptible population and the 
communicability period. The last multiplier in (3) is the communicability-weighted 
infected population that is not type-specific and may be abbreviated as  
∑
 · 

, 


. Hence, ,   1  , . 
In modeling the course of recovering, we trace the duration of the infection period 
for the infected people and assume every infected person to recover in time  after getting 
infected. That is, the number of people recovering in the period  equals: 
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 

, 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. (4) 
For simplicity, we assume that the communicability period is also equal to . 
We conclude the model by applying balance equations to the stocks of susceptible, 
infected, and recovered populations: 
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We neglect R-S transitions from recovered to the susceptible population because such 
transitions have not yet been reported to play a substantial role in the COVID-19 
epidemics. We also neglect the fatality of the disease because we intend to highlight the 
primary effects of population heterogeneity upon the overall course of the epidemic. 
Introducing R-S transitions, mortality, and more realistic demographics should pose no 
difficulty in future research.  
Assuming the entire original population is susceptible, the number of secondary 
infections per one initially infected person of type  over the communicability period  
may be found from (3) as  ∑ 
, 0

. Given the interpretation of the 
communicability parameter, that number must be equal to , i.e.,  ∑ 
, 0

 1. 
That leads to the following estimate of the parameter : 
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hereinafter,   ∑ , 

 is the communicability-weighted susceptible population. 
The model of the infection’s spread may be rewritten as 
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here, 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 is the proportion of the weighted susceptible population of type  
by the end of the period . The total number of newly infected persons,   1 
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, depends only on weighted susceptible and infected populations. 
In the following, we model the effects of a lockdown by introducing a scaling 
coefficient  that reflects the severity of social isolation, hygienic, and other 
mitigation measures in the period : 
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  1 indicates no efficient social isolation, while   0 corresponds to severe measures 
that halt the new infections completely. Eqs. (5) and (10) lead to the following closed-
form solution for the evolution of the susceptible population of type : 
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The higher the communicability parameter , the faster is the fall of the susceptible 
population in (11). That creates compositional change in the remaining susceptible 
population, a change that suppresses the communicability-weighted susceptible 
population  and checks the spread of the epidemics.    
In generating and interpreting results of simulation scenarios, it is useful to relate 
the model parameters to the commonly used basic reproduction number  
 
. To establish 
the relation, assume the initial distribution of infected people follows the model relation 
(3) and is proportional to the weighted populations of each type: , 0~
, 0. The 
basic reproduction number, i.e., the secondary infections during period  per one initial 
infection, equals: 
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That is, the basic reproduction number is the weighted average of the communicability 
parameter with weights equal to the weighted susceptible populations of each type. 
At an advanced phase of the epidemic, substantial portions of the population move 
to infected or recovered compartments, and the instantaneous reproduction number of a 
new outbreak decreases to:  
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When   % 1, a new outbreak may be contained without a lockdown.  
 
Simulation details and additional simulations 
We simulate epidemic scenarios under different assumptions about the population 
composition and the timing and the strength of a lockdown. The elementary time unit of 
simulations is one day. The communicability period   14 days and the basic 
reproduction number  
 
 3 in all simulations. We assume either single or two 
subpopulations of different communicability parameter. In the latter (heterogeneous) 
case, the communicability parameter for the first subpopulation (‘non-spreaders’) is set at 
some sub-unity level 

' 1; the parameter for the second (‘super-spreading’) 
subpopulation is set at such a level that the population-average basic reproduction 
number (12) equals 3. We form the heterogeneous populations in such a way that 10 or 
20 percent of infected people are responsible for 80 percent of the further spread of the 
epidemic, similar to what was reported in the literature 17–19. Assuming that ( percent of 
infected are responsible for ) percent of transmissions, the communicability parameter of 
non-spreaders (

) and superspreaders may be found from (12) as: 
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where *  
  
 and +  
  
. The proportion of the non-spreaders (,) is equal to: 
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. (16) 
For the heterogeneous population, where 20 percent infected are responsible for 80 
percent transmissions, 

 0.750, 

 12.1, and ,  0.985. For the more 
heterogeneous case where 10 percent of infected people transmit 80 percent of secondary 
infections, 

 0.667, 

 24, and ,  0.997.  
Our simulations start with an initial 0.01 percent of the population infected. That 
initially infected population is distributed uniformly from 1 to  in durations of 
contracting the disease. The initial distribution of the infected population by type is 
proportional to the weighted population of each type: , 0~
, 0. To assess the 
long-term costs of the epidemic, we run simulations over 40 communicability periods, 
i.e., 560 days.  
We study two types of simulations: with and without a lockdown. In the scenarios 
of the main text, the lockdown lasts for 28 days, i.e. two communicability periods and 
reduces the spread of the infection by 90 percent (  0.1). In the following Figs. S1-S3, 
we present additional simulations with two options for the lockdown strength for each of 
the three populations considered:   0.1, i.e., reduction of the spread of the virus by 90 
percent, and   0.001, i.e., almost a halt of the further spread of the virus. The duration 
of the lockdown in the figures (the shaded areas) is also 28 days.  
First, consider the homogeneous population with the basic reproduction number 
 
 
 3, in which case our model turns to the conventional SIR model. In Fig. S1, we 
present sizes of the three population compartments in four selected simulations for the 
homogeneous population: no lockdown intervention (pane (a)); lockdown reducing the 
spread of the virus by 90 percent in the center the epidemic wave starting in period  
  45 and lasting for two communicability periods (pane (b), periods of lockdown are 
shaded in the figure); a similar lockdown that begins at time   56 found to be optimal 
in terms of reducing the numbers eventually infected (pane (c)); and the optimal 
lockdown of a similar timing as before but with a stronger effect (  0.001, pane (d)). 
Percentages of the total infected population throughout the entire simulation are indicated 
in each pane (, percent of the initial population). In the absence of the lockdown, the 
model results in up to   95 percent of the homogeneous population getting infected by 
the end of the epidemic. That is considerably higher than the usually assumed proportion 
necessary to stop the spread of the disease (67 percent at  
 
 3). The latter proportion is 
surpassed thanks to the gained momentum of the epidemic when there is no lockdown or 
the timing of the lockdown is not optimal. Too early a lockdown leaves large portions of 
the population susceptible to the virus that fuels the second wave of the spread of the 
virus. The stricter the premature lockdown (simulation results not shown here), the later 
is the second wave, but the final proportion of people infected barely changes. The policy 
optimal for reducing the eventual number of infected people is a strict lockdown that 
starts when the proportion susceptible falls to 33 percent, the level sufficient to stop the 
further spread of the virus (pane (d)). Even a less strict lockdown with   0.1 that is 
similarly timed (pane (c)) leads to near-optimal results. Indeed, such an ‘optimality’ of 
the lockdown ignores infection fatality and healthcare systems’ capacity that has become 
a concern in many countries. 
In Fig. S2, we present results for a scenario of the heterogeneous population where 
20 percent of infected are responsible for 80 percent of transmissions. In this case, 1.5 
percent of the population are superspreaders with the communicability parameter 


 12.1, while the majority of 98.5 percent are non-spreaders with 

 0.750. Even 
without a policy intervention (pane (a)), the spread of the epidemic stops at   27.6 
percent of the population infected, less than half the level usually assumed for the basic 
reproduction number  
 
 3. Premature lockdown (staring at   40, pane (b)) is not 
sufficient to cool off the epidemic momentum completely (  14.7 percent), while 
optimally timed lockdown starting at   44 even if not strict enough (  0.1, pane (c)) 
results in almost an optimal outcome of   11.0 percent infected. The long-term cost of 
the epidemic is minimal (  9.7 percent) when the lockdown is both optimally timed, 
and strict enough (pane (d)).  
An even more heterogeneous case where 10 percent of infected people spread the 
virus in 80 percent of the secondary cases is presented in Fig. S3. Here, only 0.3 percent 
of the population are superspreaders with 

 24.0; the rest are non-spreaders with 


 0.667. Without any policy intervention (pane (a)), the spread of the epidemic stops 
at only    14.1 percent of the population infected. The optimally timed strict lockdown 
(staring at   39, pane (d)) reduces the proportion of the infected people to as low as 4.2 
percent. A weaker lockdown of similarly optimal timing is also efficient (  4.9 percent 
at   0.1, pane (c)). Premature lockdown (staring at   33, pane (b)), however, does 
not prevent the epidemic from gaining momentum and developing a stretched second 
wave (  8.0 percent, pane (c)).  
Selected simulation results for other heterogeneous populations with  
 
 3 are 
presented in Table S1. Even with only half of the people being non-spreaders, and with 
no lockdown, the long-term cost of the epidemic and the peak number of the infected 
people decrease by more than 30 percent as compared to the homogeneous population. In 
an extreme case where 99.9 percent of people are non-spreaders, the long-term cost of the 
epidemic is only about five percent without any policy intervention. The peak level of the 
infected population also falls dramatically as the population heterogeneity increases. 
 
Table S1. Selected simulation results for heterogeneous populations that consist of two 
subpopulations: non-spreaders with communicability parameter 

' 1 and 
superspreaders with 

4 1.  
In all cases, the basic reproduction number  
 
 3. 
The 
proportion 
of non-
spreaders, 
percent 
Reproductive 
number of 
non-
spreaders 
(5

) 
Reproductive 
number of 
superspreaders 
(5

) 
The total infected 
population at no 
lockdown, 
percent 
The peak 
infected 
population at 
no lockdown, 
percent 
0 - 3 94.9 56.1 
25 0.5 3.1 80.6 46.4 
50 0.5 3.4 65.6 36.4 
90 0.5 5.2 34.7 17.4 
99 0.5 12.7 15.6 7.3 
99.9 0.5 36.9 6.1 2.7 
99.9 a 0.333 31.3 4.0 1.9 
99.7 b 0.667 24.0 14.1 5.8 
98.5 c 0.750 12.1 27.6 12.1 
95.6 d 0.857 8.0 41.4 19.1 
Notes: 
a
 10 percent infected contribute 90 percent transmissions; 
b
 10 percent infected contribute 80 percent transmissions;  
c
 20 percent infected contribute 80 percent transmissions; 
d
 30 percent infected contribute 80 percent transmissions. 
Source: own calculations 
 
 
  
Fig. S1. Simulation results for the homogeneous population with the basic reproduction 
number  
 
 3. Compartments susceptible (the green line), infected (the red line), and 
recovered (the blue line) populations per 1000 original population. Scenarios: no 
lockdown (pane (a)), lockdown reducing the spread by 90 percent that starts at   45 
(pane (b)), lockdown reducing the spread by 90 percent that starts at   57 (pane (c)), 
and the optimal lockdown reducing the spread by 99.1 percent that starts at   57 (pane 
(d)). All lockdowns last for 14 days. Vertical axis: population size starting with 1000 
original population. Horizontal axis: time in days from the original infection of 0.01 
percent of people.  is the strength parameter of the lockdown;   is the eventual 
proportion of the population infected throughout the course of the epidemic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fig. S2. Simulation results for the heterogeneous population with the basic reproduction 
number  
 
 3 where 20 percent of infected people are responsible for 80 percent 
transmissions. 98.4 percent are non-spreaders with communicability parameter 


0.750, and 1.6 percent are superspreaders with communicability parameter 

 12.1. 
Compartments: susceptible (the green line), infected (the red line), and recovered (the 
blue line) populations per 1000 original population. Scenarios: no lockdown (pane (a)), a 
premature lockdown reducing the spread by 90 percent that starts at   40 (pane (b)), 
lockdown reducing the spread by 90 percent that starts at   44 (pane (c)), and the 
optimal lockdown reducing the spread by 99.1 percent that starts at   40 (pane (d)). All 
lockdowns last for 14 days. Vertical axis: population size starting with 1000 original 
population. Horizontal axis: time in days from the original infection of 0.01 percent of 
people.  is the strength parameter of the lockdown;   is the eventual proportion of the 
population infected throughout the course of the epidemic. 
 
 Fig. S3. Simulation results for the heterogeneous population with the basic reproduction 
number  
 
 3 where 10 percent of infected people are responsible for 80 percent 
transmissions. 99.7 percent are non-spreaders with communicability parameter 


0.667, and 0.3 percent are superspreaders with communicability parameter 

 24. 
Compartments: susceptible (the green line), infected (the red line), and recovered (the 
blue line) populations per 1000 original population. Scenarios: no lockdown (pane (a)), a 
premature lockdown reducing the spread by 90 percent that starts at   33 (pane (b)), 
lockdown reducing the spread by 90 percent that starts at   39 (pane (c)), and the 
optimal lockdown reducing the spread by 99.1 percent that starts at   39 (pane (d)). All 
lockdowns last for 14 days. Vertical axis: population size starting with 1000 original 
population. Horizontal axis: time in days from the original infection of 0.01 percent of 
people.  is the strength parameter of the lockdown;   is the eventual proportion of the 
population infected throughout the course of the epidemic. 
 
R code to reproduce the simulations 
#Celan code for the publication 
P<-1000  #population size 
R0<-3    #basic reproduction number 
tau<-14  #communcability and recovery periods 
step<-1  #modelling step, elementary time unit 
Horizon<-1:(40*tau)  #simulation horizon 
i0<-0.0001 #proportion initially infected 
I0<-i0*P   #population initially infected 
beta<-0.9 #propoirtion of non-spreaders; =0 for the homogeneous case 
k1<-0.5   #communicability parameter for the non-spreaders 
k2<-R0*(1+sqrt(1+4*beta*k1*(R0-k1)/(R0^2*(1-beta))))/2 #communicability parameter 
for the superspreaders 
K<-c(k1,k2) #communicability parameters 
 
#ditribution of the population by the communicability parameter 
distr<-rep(0,length(K)) 
distr[1]<-beta 
distr[2]<-1-beta 
#more types may be added if necessary 
 
#lockdown parameters 
Qt<-47 #beginning of lockdown 
Quaranteen<-Qt+c(1:(2*tau))-1   #period of the lockdown 
qq<-0.1  #lockdown efficiency coef. 1 - no lockdown; 0 - absolute halt of epidemic 
Q<-ifelse(Horizon %in% Quaranteen,qq,1)  
#generate scenario 
Pkt<-CoVgen(P=P,K=K,distr=distr,I0=I0,Q=Q,Horizon=Horizon,tau=tau,step=step) 
#summary and plot 
Pt.agr<-aggregate(Pkt[,-1], by=list(t=Pkt$t), FUN=sum) 
plot(Pt.agr$t,Pt.agr$S,type="l",col="darkgreen", 
     ylim=c(0,P),xlim=c(0,20*tau/step),xlab="",ylab="") 
if(is.na(qq)|qq<0) qq="lim.prev." 
lines(Pt.agr$t,Pt.agr$I,col="red") 
lines(Pt.agr$t,Pt.agr$R,col="blue") 
R.final<-Pt.agr[Pt.agr$t==max(Horizon),]$R 
 
if(min(Q)<1) rect(min(Horizon[Q!=1]),-10,max(Horizon[Q!=1]), 
                  1100,density=30,col="grey",border=NA) 
text(x=9*tau/step,y=min(0.75*P,R.final),paste("q=",qq,"\nI=",paste(round(100*R.final/P
,1),"%")),pos=3,font=2) 
 
#function generating the epidemic scenario for the given set of parameters 
CoVgen<-function(P,K,distr,I0,Q,Horizon=1:length(Q),tau=14,step=1) { 
  distr<-distr/sum(distr) 
  I.matr<-matrix(rep(0,length(K)*tau),ncol=tau) 
  P.k<-P*distr 
  N0<-sum(K*P.k) 
  alpha<-step/(tau*N0) 
  I.k<-pmin(P.k,I0*K*P.k/N0) 
  if(sum(I.k)<I0) { 
    P.resid<-P.k-I.k 
    I.k<-I.k+(I0-sum(I.k))*P.resid/sum(P.resid) 
  } 
  I.matr[,1:tau]<-I.k/tau 
  I.k<-rowSums(I.matr) 
  I<-sum(I.k) 
  J<-sum(K*I.k) 
  S<-P.k-I.k 
  N<-sum(K*S) 
  R0.effective<-(J/I)*N/N0   
  Pkt<-data.frame(t=0,k=K,P=P,S=S,I=I.k,R=0, 
                  N=N,J=J,R0=R0, 
                  R0.effective=R0.effective) 
  for (t in Horizon)  { 
    q<-Q[Horizon==t] #lockdown parameter: the lockdown reduces alfa q-fold 
    S.prev<-Pkt[Pkt$t==t-1,]$S 
    R.prev<-Pkt[Pkt$t==t-1,]$R 
    I.prev<-Pkt[Pkt$t==t-1,]$I 
    J.prev<-sum(K*I.prev) 
    I.k.new<-pmin(S.prev,q*alpha*K*S.prev*J.prev) 
    I.rec<-I.matr[,tau] 
    I.matr[,2:tau]<-I.matr[,1:(tau-1)] 
    I.matr[,1]<-I.k.new 
    I.k<-rowSums(I.matr) 
    S<-S.prev-I.k.new 
    R<-R.prev+I.rec 
    I<-sum(I.k) 
    J<-sum(K*I.k) 
    N<-sum(K*S) 
    R0.effective<-(J/I)*N/N0 
    Pkt<-rbind(Pkt, 
               data.frame(t=t,k=K,P=P,S=S,I=I.k,R=R, 
                          N=N,J=J,R0=R0, 
                          R0.effective=R0.effective)) 
  } 
  return(Pkt) 
} 
 
